Introduction
In recent years, the Indo-Pacific region has emerged as a focal point of global geopolitics, with major powers actively seeking to engage as stakeholders in the region’s evolving dynamics. Notable examples include Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy and Indo-Pacific Vision, the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy, Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, India’s Act East Policy and Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), Korea’s Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific, and ASEAN’s own Indo-Pacific Outlook. Additionally, countries located in the southern hemisphere portion of the Indo-Pacific—such as New Zealand and Australia—have been developing their own Indo-Pacific strategies, with Australia recently launching its new Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040. Beyond these regional actors, European powers such as the European Union, the United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Germany, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania have also formulated their own Indo-Pacific policies.
Key Objectives
While the specific objectives of these Indo-Pacific policies/strategies vary according to their respective national interests, they nevertheless generally prioritize regional peace and stability, as well as promoting regional development and prosperity. In this context, regional peace and economic prosperity can be seen as key themes (or common denominators) among the contending Indo-Pacific approaches. These objectives reflect underlying risks or challenges, including the great power struggles and intense competition among major powers, various conflicts and crises arising from traditional security issues over territory or sovereignty, and concerns regarding the purposeful expansion of authoritarianism and irrational actions from authoritarian powers. Although most countries refrain from explicitly naming the source of these risks to avoid targeted criticisms, concerns regarding the uncontrollable behavior of an authoritarian China are increasingly evident.
A clear illustration of this is seen in the recent two-plus-two US-South Korea dialogues, which highlighted Taiwan and the importance of stability across the Taiwan Strait. Additionally, Japan has not only strengthened its cooperation with NATO but has also recently advanced a security and defense partnership agreement with the European Union, reflecting the countries’ shared concerns regarding China’s heightened assertive maritime activities and a growing consensus that these activities are a source of insecurity in the region. These trends warrant attention regarding the security of the Taiwan Strait and other Indo-Pacific hotspots, such as the South China Sea.
Core Interests and Future-Oriented Approaches
The above mentioned Indo-Pacific policies/strategies clearly embody a vision for the future, aiming to foster a free, peaceful, and prosperous region. This future is not intended to be dominated by any specific hegemon (particularly authoritarian powers), but rather to be shared and co-facilitated by all regional actors and stakeholders. For example, the purpose of Canada’s Indo-Pacific policy is to ensure that Canada plays an active role in shaping the future of the Indo-Pacific region. This purpose applies to other major powers in the Indo-Pacific region. By examining the major powers’ shared goals of regional stability and economic prosperity, it is evident that values, security, and economy are three core interests underpinning their Indo-Pacific policies. While approaches to securing these core interests may differ among countries, they generally encompass at least six distinct practices as pillars for a resilient future of the Indo-Pacific region, inclusive of: (1) strengthening partnerships; (2) trade and economic engagement; (3) security and defense cooperation; (4) climate change and environmental sustainability; (5) promoting democratic values; and (6) cultural and people-to-people links.
Regardless of the specifics, a common thread is an emphasis on deepening shared values—especially democracy, freedom, and the principle of avoiding threats of military force against others. Additionally, enhancing the economic and social resilience of respective countries and the entire region is crucial. Ultimately, ensuring security and economic benefits necessitates strengthening cooperation and partnerships among stakeholders.
Different Features among Indo-Pacific Policies in and outside the Region
The Indo-Pacific countries located within the “general admission floor section” have developed relatively concrete Indo-Pacific policies, featuring clear action plans and initiatives. For instance, Korea’s Indo-Pacific policy places significant emphasis on specific objectives and methods related to denuclearization, counter-terrorism, comprehensive security, and economic security cooperation network. This focus undeniably reflects Seoul’s priority of ensuring national security, particularly against military threats from North Korea and its economic advantages.
Moreover, Japan’s new plan for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific is built on four pillars: (1) the principles of peace and prosperity; (2) addressing challenges in an Indo-Pacific way; (3) multi-layered connectivity; and (4) expanded efforts for security and the open use of the “sea” and the “air” spaces of the region. Meanwhile, India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) clearly outlines seven pillars, highlighting key areas from the perspective of India as a maritime power, including: (1) maritime security; (2) economic cooperation; (3) sustainable development; (4) disaster risk reduction; (5) scientific research and development; (6) cultural cooperation and enhancing people-to-people ties; and (7) capacity building.
In contrast, European countries, despite positioning themselves as stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific, face limitations due to their geographic distance from the region. Instead, their Indo-Pacific policies often center on calls for cooperation, and they structure their approaches around collaborative appeals. These include The European Union Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and The Czech Republic’s Strategy for Cooperation with the Indo-Pacific. The EU strategy emphasizes building a strong foundation for mutually beneficial relationships and enhancing engagement, highlighting the importance of the Indian Ocean as Europe’s gateway to the Indo-Pacific and supporting ASEAN’s central role. It also identifies seven priority areas for collaborative goals: (1) sustainable and inclusive prosperity; (2) green transition; (3) maritime governance; (4) digital governance and partnerships; (5) connectivity; (6) security and defense; and (7) human security.
Similarly, the Czech Republic’s strategy encompasses priority areas such as: (1) focusing on bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation in trade and investment; (2) strengthening security and defense collaboration with Indo-Pacific nations; (3) promoting democratic values and human rights protection in addressing common threats; (4) fostering technological exchange and innovation, particularly in high-tech sectors, green technology, and the digital economy; (5) collaboration on climate change and sustainable development; and (6) cultural and people-to-people exchanges.
Moreover, the Czech strategy emphasizes that the Indo-Pacific is “closer than we think,” revealing that Europe’s interests as a stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific region are not as distant as they may seem.
Taiwan’s Practices
The New Southbound Policy
Since 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) New Southbound Policy (NSP, 新南向政策) has served as Taiwan’s regional strategy for Asia, and is positioned at the core of Taiwan’s own Indo-Pacific policy. Over the past eight years, the NSP has highlighted Taiwan’s strengths and contribution to the region in various sectors—including economic and industrial connections, education, public health and medical care, and agriculture—which have been fostered by flagship programs led by key ministries (public sector), strengthened by Taiwanese business/production networks in the region (private sector), and promoted via collaboration among civil society organizations/NGOs (people sector)—all together forging a multifaceted and cross-sectoral partnership. Through bi-directional exchanges and cooperation through the P-P-P-P synergetic approach, Taiwan has deepened trust and partnerships with neighboring countries. These efforts, accumulated over the past eight years, have successfully guided Taiwan to navigate through geopolitical crises and global changes, allowing the international community to gain a renewed understanding of Taiwan.
Taiwan’s ”people-centered” NSP has emerged as a proactive approach in response to global challenges such as the US-China rivalry, supply chain challenges, and, especially, the COVID-19 pandemic. With the government leading and civil society supporting, the results of the NSP’s implementation have been significant during Tsai’s presidency. Taiwanese businesses have profited outside of China in various NSP partner countries, and civil society has enhanced mutual understanding and exchanges with more like-minded partners in the region, fulfilling the proactive goals of the NSP to generate benefits and foster decent relationships.
Current international consensus has recognized that completely decoupling from the Chinese economy is not a short-term endeavor. It requires the pragmatic implementation of various “de-risking” measures. While de-risking cannot be achieved overnight, it is a crucial global restructuring process that necessitates time for preparation. However, it must begin now, or else the risks and crises associated with China will never be mitigated or well-managed. Since its beginning in Tsai’s presidency, Taiwan’s NSP has served as a pragmatic means for economic and political de-risking against China—while actively promoting multifaceted connectivity to build solid friendships and partnerships with the 16 NSP partner countries in the Indo-Pacific region, and eight priority countries in particular (Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, India and Australia).From NSP to NSP+Since taking office in May of 2024, President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) has approached foreign relations with caution and composure. He has constantly emphasized the significance of “value-based diplomacy” for Taiwan, summarizing its core elements with the acronym “DPP,” which stands for “democracy,” “peace,” and “prosperity.” We believe that this newly proposed value-based diplomacy—or “Shin-Lai Diplomacy” (“reliable diplomacy”)—has three characteristics: First, it deepens cooperation with like-minded partner countries—reinforcing existing relationships with the United States, Japan, Europe, and Southeast Asia/South Asia/Australia and New Zealand—based on shared values and common interests.
Second, it strives for active engagement from “diplomatic allies” to “prosperous allies”—particularly through the initiatives and funds proposed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) under his “comprehensive diplomacy” concept, providing innovative solutions to meet the development needs of allies.
Third, in response to the evolving dynamics of the Indo-Pacific, President Lai will undoubtedly continue and innovate the NSP.
President Lai has repeatedly stated his commitment to extending the NSP—which, based on eight years of effort, has achieved commendable results in addressing the challenges in the Indo-Pacific. He agrees with promoting an innovative “enhanced New Southbound Policy,” which could be referred to directly as “New Southbound Policy+.”
We propose that this “+” should align with President Lai’s core goals of value-based diplomacy, further strengthening the existing DPP framework by focusing on “development,” “people-centered (initiatives),” and fostering “partnerships.” Beyond continuing the foundation of past successes, President Lai’s “NSP+” is expected to further advance Taiwan’s indispensable role in global trade.
Upon careful review, these advantages and achievements include government priorities such as high-tech supply chain security and innovative digital solutions, public health and medical services, and resilience and disaster preparedness. Additionally, the Lai Administration’s recent emphasis on “economic and technological diplomacy” will apply simultaneously to like-minded countries under the NSP. Furthermore, civil society and NGOs can also take the lead in materializing the “NSP+” framework: by expanding regional think tank dialogues and cooperation, establishing Taiwan as an NGO training center, and nurturing a new generation of Asian young talents.
For many years, the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation (TAEF, 財團法人臺灣亞洲交流基金會) has served as a think tank for Taiwan’s NSP. We believe that President Lai’s “NSP+” can better build on the solid foundation of previous successes while introducing bold and innovative breakthroughs. These could be structured into six new corridors/strategies for the NSP+, including three already instrumentalized and shouldered by the government: the “NSP Semiconductor and Digital Technology Corridor,” which focuses on providing innovative solutions and building resilient supply chains; the expansion of the existing one-country multi-center (OCMC) health program into a “NSP Health Corridor;” and the establishment of an “NSP Resilience Corridor” with the purpose of enhancing disaster preparedness and regional resilience.
On the non-governmental front, another three corridors could be materialized and led by civil society organizations. These efforts would be: (1) expanding regional think tank dialogue and cooperation, in order to craft an “NSP Think Tank Corridor;” (2) establishing Taiwan as an NGO training center through an “NSP NGO Corridor;” and (3) nurturing new generations of Asian talent through an “NSP Youth Corridor.” The content of these six “NSP+” corridors/strategies aligns with the aforementioned two DPP values.
Furthermore, the “NSP+” will further demonstrate to the international community that “Taiwan can not only help but is also more than willing to lead.” It will also aid in implementing “value-based diplomacy” and enrich President Lai’s vision of building up a global Taiwan. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific policy emphasized and practiced through the “New Southbound Policy+” aims not just to establish narrowly-defined supply chains for semiconductor chips, but also to craft more interdependent survival chains in other sectors.
Looking Ahead
We argue that Taiwan’s approach to the Indo-Pacific policy is a responsive strategy rather than a brand new grand strategy. This policy should emphasize Taiwan’s indispensability across the globe, and highlight coordination with other Indo-Pacific policy initiatives. We contend that Taiwan’s Indo-Pacific policy is not entirely new: it builds upon the NSP. With that, we advocate the following features:
First, in response to the increasingly intricate landscape of Indo-Pacific policies, Taiwan needs to engage with like-minded partners through six corridors that connect and respond to their Indo-Pacific policies/strategies. These corridors highlight the unique features of Taiwan’s contributions, emphasizing active leadership and inspiration from civil society rather than a sole focus on government programs. A stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region must be open and free, grounded in robust partnerships and transnational connectivity among civil societies.
Second, Taiwan’s Indo-Pacific stance will individually emphasize a people-centered and values-based diplomacy, highlighting inclusive development agendas. The NSP+ aims to reinvigorate the interdependent survival chain through the instrumentalization of the value chains, rather than narrowly concentrating on a self-interest-driven semiconductor supply chain.
Third, cooperation and partnerships should be and will be the key. While some powers’ Indo-Pacific policies/strategies focus on collaborative policies, the majority involve international cooperation and regional partnerships on specific issues. Likewise, the international community must recognize that an inclusive international cooperative framework involving Taiwan is healthy, resilient and constructive, and this should be a key priority of Indo-Pacific policies for all.
The NSP/NSP+ has been the core of Taiwan’s Indo-Pacific strategy, and it has effectively responded to the central values, objectives and priorities of the world’s existing Indo-Pacific strategies with a substantive framework—one built upon Taiwan’s strengths and values to create a more resilient and inclusive future for the region.
The main point: The New Southbound Policy, which was initiated under the Tsai Administration and has continued under the Lai Administration, is a key component of Taiwan’s Indo-Pacific policies. This should be upgraded into a New Southbound Policy +, which would add three new policy “corridors”: expanding regional think tank dialogue and cooperation, in order to craft an “NSP Think Tank Corridor;” (2) establishing Taiwan as an NGO training center through an “NSP NGO Corridor;” and (3) nurturing new generations of Asian talent through an “NSP Youth Corridor.
This text is published in Global Taiwan Brief/Vol. 9, Issue 23.
For full text: https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/...